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Abstract: This paper puts forward an account of imaginative immersion. Elaborating on Kendall 
Walton’s thesis that imagining aims at the fictional truth, it first argues that imaginings are 
inherently rule- or norm-governed: they are ‘regulated’ by that which is presented as fictionally 
true. It then shows that an imaginer can follow the rule or norm mandating her to imagine the 
propositions presented as fictional truths either by acquiring explicit beliefs about how the rule 
(norm) is to be followed, or directly, without acquiring such beliefs. It proceeds to argue that to 
the extent that an imaginer follows this rule (norm) without holding such beliefs, she is more 
immersed in her imaginings. The general idea is that immersion in an activity is a matter of 
following rules or norms that apply to that activity without explicitly thinking about how to 
follow them, that is, without ‘doxastic mediation.’ Lastly, the paper shows that this thesis can 
explain various features associated with imaginative immersion, such as the sort of attentiveness 




We sometimes become lost in our imaginings. Whether we are imagining in response to reading 
or watching a work of fiction, or in the course of pretending, playing games of make-believe, 
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daydreaming, etc., we often become engrossed in our imaginative activity. Although imaginative 
immersion is a familiar phenomenon, there is no consensus as to its cognitive structure. In §2, I 
survey and critique existing accounts of imaginative immersion, and identify what I take to be 
the core aspect of imaginative immersion. I argue that immersion is a matter of the way we 
follow the general rule or norm that governs imagining, namely, that imaginers are to imagine 
the propositions presented as fictionally true: to the extent that we follow this rule or norm 
without acquiring explicit beliefs about the specifics of how to follow it, we are more immersed 
in our imaginings. 
To develop this idea, I first elucidate the sense in which imaginings are ‘regulated,’ that is, 
rule- or norm-governed. Drawing on Kendall Walton’s thesis that imagining aims at the fictional 
truth as belief aims at truth (Walton 1990, 41), I argue that the imaginings in a given imaginative 
project are governed by that which is presented, at each stage of the project, as fictionally true. 
That is, in imagining, we ipso facto follow the rule (norm) that propositions that are presented as 
fictional truths are to be imagined (§3). 
As in following rules in general, we can follow the rule or norm that regulates imagining, 
i.e., that propositions presented as fictional truths are to be imagined, either by acquiring explicit 
beliefs about the specifics of how to follow this rule (norm), or more directly, without such 
‘mediating’ beliefs. To the extent that we imagine without explicitly thinking about which 
propositions we are to imagine, we are more immersed in imagining. Indeed, being immersed in 
imagining means that the rule in question becomes ‘transparent’ for us, in that we do not hold 
explicit beliefs about the details of how to follow it. 
Since there are various ways in which propositions can be presented as fictionally true, the 
rule (norm) that such propositions are to be imagined, and the distinction between doxastically-
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mediated and non-doxastically-mediated compliance with this rule, apply in various ways. I 
discuss the various ways in which the rule can be followed in §4, showing how in every case, 
immersion arises from the absence of conscious, non-dispositional beliefs regarding the specifics 
of how the rule that regulates imagining is to be followed. Lastly, in §5, I show how the 
proposed account of imaginative immersion elucidates various characteristics of immersion, such 
as the ‘attentiveness’ and increased emotional engagement ascribed to an immersed imaginer. 
The paper ends with an explanation of the phenomenon of spoilers in terms of imaginative 
immersion. 
 
2. Imaginative Immersion: Background and Explication 
 
2.1 Existing Accounts of Imaginative Immersion 
 
On the account of immersion proposed in Schellenberg (2013), imagining and belief exist on a 
continuum. Schellenberg argues that although ‘pure’ imaginings can be easily distinguished from 
beliefs, certain mental states—specifically, those that arise during imaginative immersion—
cannot be categorized as either imaginings or beliefs. The absence of a clear-cut distinction, she 
maintains, is similar to the absence of a clear-cut distinction between certain shades: whereas 
‘pure’ yellow, e.g., can be readily distinguished from red, there are shades between yellow and 
red that cannot be categorized as either yellow or red. The lack of a clear distinction between 
imaginings and beliefs, Schellenberg claims, explains immersion. When we become immersed in 
imagining, we cease to be aware that we are imagining: we take the fictional world, temporarily, 
to be the real world (Schellenberg 2013, 507). We shift seamlessly from mental states that are 
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‘pure’ imaginings to mental states that are more akin to belief, taking the content of our 
imaginings to be true, just as we take the content of our beliefs to be true (508-510). 
Schellenberg’s explanation of immersion is disputed by Liao and Doggett (2014), who 
adduce evidence to the effect that immersed imaginers are aware of real-world facts, and do not 
take the imagined content to be true. A subject who is immersed in, e.g., playing with playdough, 
does not try to bite a playdough cookie; an actor who is immersed in imagining himself to be a 
fictional character is fully aware of the camera’s presence. Chasid (2017) challenges 
Schellenberg’s view by showing that in addition to imagining, imaginers also posit an imaginary 
world at which their imaginings are directed. Since imaginings are assessed for truth in the 
posited world, whereas beliefs are assessed for truth in the real world, the difference between 
imaginings and beliefs is categorical, not gradational. 
In light of these critiques, we can endorse the claim that immersed imaginers do not believe 
the content of their imaginings. Yet there seems to be a sense in which immersion increases the 
similarity between imaginings and beliefs (a claim that may be compatible with some of 
Schellenberg’s observations), though imaginings and beliefs are categorically different. I will 
explain this similarity by drawing on Kendall Walton’s thesis that imagining aims at fictional 
truth just as belief aims at truth (Walton 1990, 41). I will argue that the more one is immersed in 
imagining, the more imaginings function like beliefs with respect to their regulation by the 
propositions presented as ‘truths’ (in the case of beliefs, real-world truths, in the case of 
imaginings, fictional truths). 
Other accounts of immersion explain it in terms of attentiveness. Explaining immersion in 
terms of attentiveness is appealing, since in some contexts, e.g., that of conversation, being 
‘immersed’ seems to entail no more than profound attentiveness. Liao (unpublished) argues that 
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the difference between immersed and non-immersed imaginers lies in “the information that they 
attend to. Immersed pretenders and actors attend to the fictional content of make-believe. … But 
non-immersed pretenders and actors attend to make-believe itself” (7). Likewise, someone who 
‘loses’ herself in reading or watching a work of fiction attends to the “happenings of the story 
world” rather than “the writing style, the plot structure, and other features about the book itself” 
(7). Kampa (2018) similarly invokes the notion of attentiveness to explain how actors, for 
instance, by paying attention to the content of the “Possible World Box” (692), become 
immersed in imagining themselves to be fictional characters, and thus engage in imaginative 
transportation. 
The problem with attention-based accounts of immersion is that it is unclear how 
attentiveness can differentiate between immersed and non-immersed imaginers. Given that we 
seek to explain the difference between immersed and non-immersed imaginers, not the 
difference between an imaginer and a non-imaginer (e.g., between a reader who imagines a story 
she reads, and one who merely reads it to proofread it), what does it mean to say that an 
immersed imaginer ‘attends’ to what she imagines more deeply than a non-immersed imaginer 
does? Presumably, subjects can imagine the same fictional content, but be immersed in their 
respective imaginings to different degrees.1 If so, then without further qualification, attentiveness 
does not distinguish immersed imaginers from non- (or less-) immersed imaginers. 
 
1 In arguing against Schellenberg, Liao and Doggett (2014, 266-267) adduce a case where the 
difference between non-immersed and immersed pretenders is clearly categorical: a mother 
playing ‘cops and robbers’ with her son first believes ‘I’m a mother who’s pretending to be a 




Granted, there is a sense in which an immersed imaginer feels ‘drawn’ by the fictional 
content, and ‘attends’ to it—without losing track of reality—more intensely than a non-immersed 
imaginer does. But this sense of attentiveness is not a matter of the imagined content. Rather, it is 
a matter of the way in which imaginers follow the general rule or norm that governs imagining. I 
contend that an imaginer is more immersed in imagining to the extent that she follows the rule or 
norm that generally governs imagining (namely, that we are to imagine that which is presented as 
fictionally true; see below) without the mediation of explicit beliefs about the details of how it is 
to be followed. The idea is that in imagining, as in certain other contexts, being immersed 
(absorbed, engrossed) is a matter of how a subject engages in a rule-governed activity. 
Another account of imaginative immersion associates it with emotional engagement with 
fictional content. Langland-Hassan, for instance, takes immersion in fiction to be “nothing over 
and above being deeply emotionally engaged by [the fictional content]” (Langland-Hassan 2020, 
186). He then argues—in line with his overall theory of imagination, which reduces imaginings 
to folk-psychological states—that immersion (i.e., deep emotional engagement with fictional 
content) can be explained by adducing the imaginer’s beliefs and desires regarding what happens 
in the work in question (ch. 11). 
 
is a shift from believing to imagining, is irrelevant to providing an account of immersion, where 
the crucial distinction is that between an immersed imaginer and a non- (or less-) immersed 
imaginer. With regard to this distinction, the relevant shift is a shift from one imagining to 
another imagining, both of which have the content ‘I’m a cop.’ 
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Setting aside certain difficulties in Langland-Hassan’s reductive theory,2 the problem with 
his account of immersion is that imaginative immersion need not be accompanied by emotional 
engagement. We can be intrigued by a novel’s plot and become immersed in it, without being 
moved by the fictional content, simply because no particular emotional response is relevant to 
that content. Indeed, empirical studies of imaginative immersion have found it to be associated, 
to varying extents, not only with emotional responses, but also, e.g., with an experience of 
‘flow,’ a sense of ‘being present’ in the fictional world, vividness of mental imagery, etc. (see, 
e.g., Green and Donahue 2009; Iachini et al. 2019). To the extent that emotions are aroused by 
the imagined content, immersion may involve deep emotional engagement (see §5 below). But 
since immersion need not involve emotional responses, it cannot be identified with them. To 
 
2 Briefly, there are two respects in which Langland-Hassan’s thesis that imaginings are beliefs 
(judgments, desires, etc.) may be problematic. First, we sometimes believe that it is fictionally 
true that p, but imagine that not-p, hence imaginings cannot be defined as beliefs about a given 
fictional scenario. For instance, we may know (say, from a spoiler) the identity of the murderer 
in a certain murder mystery, but we can nonetheless imagine, in reading the mystery’s first 
chapters, that the murderer is someone else, as per the work’s initial intimations. In such cases, 
what we imagine differs from what we believe about the fictional content. The same is true vis-à-
vis other folk-psychological attitudes to the fictional content p: we can have those attitudes while 
imagining not-p. Secondly, consider spontaneous imaginings. Since beliefs arise for a reason or 
in response to evidence, whereas spontaneous imaginings are extemporaneous, spontaneous 
imaginings cannot be identical to beliefs about the fictional scenarios. 
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account for immersion, the focus should be on how we imagine, not how we react to our 
imaginings. 
The same problem afflicts accounts that try to characterize immersion, or explain it, in terms 
of how imaginings motivate us to act (see Sinhababu 2016, §4). Immersion cannot be 
characterized or explained in terms of how imaginings motivate the imaginer to act (e.g., in 
pretending), because one can be immersed in imagining (e.g., in daydreaming, engaging with 
works of fiction, etc.) without being motivated to act, or acting. In general, the ‘outputs’ of 
imagining—emotions, motivations, etc.—can be affected by state of immersion, but as such, can 
neither be identified with immersion nor explain it. 
 
2.2 The Core Aspect of Immersion 
 
My account of immersion indeed focuses on how imaginings arise. It invokes the fact that being 
immersed in an activity sometimes connotes ‘direct’ compliance with that activity’s rules or 
norms. In such cases, one follows those rules or norms without explicitly thinking about how to 
do so. For instance, when immersed in a culture, language, or yoga practice, one’s activity is 
governed directly by the applicable rules: one follows the rules without acquiring (in real time) 
explicit beliefs about how they are to be followed in the specific situation at hand. Consider 
linguistic activity. Learning a language usually involves the acquisition of beliefs about how 
sentences in that language are structured, e.g., beliefs about the language’s default word order, 
i.e., the order in which subjects, verbs, direct and indirect objects are ordinarily arranged. Until 
we master the language, in composing a sentence, we must explicitly think about the 
grammatical roles played by each of the words we intend to use. Following the language’s 
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syntactical rules requires us, with respect to every sentence we formulate, to acquire explicit 
beliefs about how the rules apply to the words we use. 
At a certain stage, however, we become immersed in the language, and need not acquire 
such beliefs. We build up sentences ‘automatically,’ without explicitly thinking about each word 
and its grammatical role. Moreover, once our activity is governed by the rules directly, i.e., 
without explicit doxastic mediation, we cannot articulate how the rules apply to the sentences we 
are uttering without compromising our immersion: specifying how the rules of grammar apply to 
the particular sentences we are uttering reduces our degree of immersion. 
This is true not only of immersion in linguistic activity, but also of immersion in other 
regulated activities. My main thesis is that it is likewise the core aspect of imaginative 
immersion. Someone immersed in imagining hardly holds explicit beliefs about the specifics of 
how to apply the rule or norm that ‘regulates’ imaginative activity. Granted, there are differences 
between immersion in cultures or languages, and immersion in pretense, works of fiction, 
daydreams, and other sorts of imaginative projects; imaginative immersion ensues from the way 
imaginings are regulated. As I will explain in §3, imaginings are inherently regulated by that 
which is presented as fictionally true in the pertinent imaginative project. (The various ways in 
which an imaginer can follow the rule that such propositions are to be imagined, whether via 
doxastic mediation or directly, and accordingly, the various ways in which imaginative 
immersion can arise, will be elucidated in §4.) 
Two preliminary comments are in order. First, my account of imaginative immersion is 
neutral with respect to the metaphysics of rule-following. Famously, Kripkean skeptics maintain 
that rule-following cannot be explained in terms of intentions or other mental representations 
(chiefly because such an explanation presupposes the notion of rule-following), nor can it be 
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explained in terms of the subject’s dispositions. Rather, rule-following is sui generis or has a 
primitive component (see, e.g., Boghossian 2005; 2008; Ginsborg 2011; Schlosser 2011). Others 
downplay Kripkean skepticism and develop accounts of rule-following that do invoke intentional 
or dispositional elements (e.g., Pettit 1990; Schlosser 2011; Horst 2019; for an overview, see 
Glüer and Wikforss 2020). My account of immersion does not presuppose any of these accounts. 
Specifically, the distinction between following a rule by thinking about the details of how to 
follow it in a particular situation (e.g., in following grammatical rules, by acquiring explicit 
beliefs about which term in a sentence is the subject, which is the verb, etc.), and following a rule 
without explicitly thinking about these specifics, is pre-theoretical. It is, indeed, a psychological 
fact that we can follow a rule either by explicitly pondering the details of its application in a 
particular case, or without pondering those details. The crucial point for my argument is that this 
general distinction applies to imagining: the rule or norm that regulates imagining (see §3) can 
be followed by way of explicit doxastic mediation, or without explicit doxastic mediation (§4). 
The second comment pertains to my use of the term ‘explicit belief.’ Explicit beliefs should 
be distinguished not only from sub-personal representations (Lyons 2016), but also from three 
types of beliefs discussed in the literature. First, explicit beliefs differ from non-occurrent beliefs, 
namely, belief-representations that are stored in memory without being currently retrieved (see, 
e.g., Audi 1994; Schwitzgebel 2019, §2.1). Second, explicit beliefs differ from states that, though 
not stored in memory, are “swiftly derivable” from what one believes to be true (Schwitzgebel 
2019, §2.2.1; Audi 1994 deems such beliefs mere “dispositions to believe”). Third, explicit 
beliefs are conscious, and hence differ from representational states deemed to be unconscious 




My invocation of ‘explicit’ beliefs is intended to exclude the aforementioned types of states. 
Explicit beliefs are invoked vis-à-vis situations where a rule or norm is followed by the 
imaginer’s consciously representing, in an occurrent belief, the details relevant to its application. 
My claim is that immersion in an activity depends on the extent to which we acquire such 
explicit beliefs: to the extent that we follow a rule without the mediation of explicit beliefs, we 
are more immersed in our activity. Specifically, in imagining, to the extent that we follow the 
rule or norm that governs imagining without acquiring explicit beliefs, we are more immersed in 
our imaginings. 
Before defending this claim, I must first unpack the thesis that imagining is rule- or norm-
governed. 
 
3. The Regulation of Imaginings 
 
It is often claimed that imaginings are generally unconstrained, that we are ordinarily free to 
choose what to imagine. Though there do seem to be a few cases where it is difficult or 
impossible to imagine certain propositions—e.g., overt logical contradictions (Kind 2013, 151) 
and morally- or aesthetically-deviant propositions (as per the puzzle of imaginative resistance; 
see Tuna 2020)—it is hard to deny that imaginings are largely unconstrained. This lack of 
constraint comes to the fore when imaginings are compared to beliefs vis-à-vis their respective 
commitments to truth. Beliefs are committed to truth, imaginings are not. Similarities between 
imaginings and beliefs exist at the level of ‘output’: imaginings can generate emotional 
responses, conative states, and other kinds of states that are identical or similar to those 
generated by beliefs with the same content. But imaginings and beliefs differ vis-à-vis truth-
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commitment: imaginings, unlike beliefs, are not responsive to evidence, their content need not be 
consistent with the content of the imaginer’s beliefs, etc. 
There is, however, a different sense in which imaginings are constrained or ‘regulated.’ This 
sense is explained in Walton (1990, 39ff). Accepting that imaginings are not truth-committed, 
Walton argues that every imaginative project involves propositions that are to be imagined: a 
subject who does not imagine these ‘to-be-imagined’ propositions is either not engaged with the 
project, or is imagining “improperly” (39). At first sight, Walton’s claim can be interpreted 
superficially: the mandate to imagine certain propositions is expressed through instructions or 
intentions to imagine. For instance, if we decide or agree to imagine that we are “traveling to 
Saturn in a rocket” (39), then if we do not imagine this proposition (and related ones), we violate 
our decision or agreement. Likewise, if a work of fiction instructs us to imagine, say, that the 
protagonist lives in London Ontario, and in reading that work, we imagine that the protagonist 
lives in London England, our imaginings are ‘improper,’ since we are not imagining what we 
were instructed to imagine. 
Violation of instructions or agreements to imagine, however, does not establish that 
imaginings are inherently subject to regulation. If imaginings are constrained only by external 
guidance, then imaginative projects, in themselves, are not inherently rule-governed. Walton’s 
thesis goes beyond this simple claim: its import is that imaginings are internally regulated. For 
one thing, Walton asserts that spontaneous imaginings are also regulated (1990, 44). For another, 
Walton seems to maintain that even when imaginings are prompted by instructions or intentions, 
and in that sense externally regulated, this regulation is contingent, and had those imaginings 
arisen without any prompting by instructions or intentions, they would still have been subject to 
regulation of a different sort. 
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To understand Walton’s point, consider one of his best-known examples, a game of make-
believe in which the players take tree-stumps in a forest to be bears (1990, 37ff.). In this game, 
tree-stumps serve as “props,” as “generators of fictional truths” (37). The players accept that if it 
is true that there is a tree-stump at a certain spot, it is fictionally true that there is a bear at that 
spot. This stipulation also guides the players’ imaginings: if they believe that there is a tree-
stump at a certain spot, they imagine that there is a bear at that spot. Walton emphasizes that 
players do not necessarily imagine every fictional truth (specifically, every proposition that 
follows from the stumps-are-bears stipulation); there may, e.g., be tree-stumps they are unaware 
of. Nor does it follow that whatever players imagine is fictionally true: they can, e.g., mistake a 
moss-covered boulder for a tree-stump, and thus imagine the fictional falsehood that there is a 
bear where the boulder is. 
Walton’s example demonstrates that imaginative projects have two distinct elements: (a) 
stipulated fictional truths (or a ‘fictional world,’ i.e., a set of fictional truths; see Walton 1990, 
66-67), and (b) imaginings (the content of an imagining is either a fictional truth or a fictional 
falsehood). The regulation of imagining, Walton argues, follows, not from these elements in 
themselves, but from their relation: fictional truths are propositions that are to be imagined. This 
relation—the relation between imaginings and fictional truths—is the same as the relation 
between beliefs and truths: “imagining aims at the fictional [truth] as belief aims at the true. 
What is true is to be believed; what is fictional is to be imagined” (Walton 1990, 41). 
On Walton’s view, then, when we engage in an imaginative activity, our imaginings are 
constrained by the pertinent fictional truths. Qua imaginers, we act, vis-à-vis fictional truths, just 
as we act, qua believers, vis-à-vis truth simpliciter. Granted, in believing, we cannot alter or—to 
the extent that we act rationally—disregard truths simpliciter, whereas in imagining, we are free 
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to alter or disregard fictional truths, either by ending the imaginative project, or by engaging in a 
different imaginative project (i.e., a project with different fictional truths). In this respect, our 
imaginative activity indeed differs from our doxastic activity. But while we are engaged in a 
specific imaginative project, our imaginings are regulated by the fictional truths of that project, 
just as beliefs are regulated by truth simpliciter. 
It is important to distinguish between the rule or norm that regulates imagining in general, 
and stipulations that determine which propositions are fictionally true. The stumps-are-bears 
stipulation, for instance, can be seen as a principle that determines fictional truths (see Walton 
1990, §I.4 regarding “principles of generation”; see also §4 below). By grasping this stipulation, 
participants in the game, as well as non-participants, can discover which propositions are 
considered fictional truths of the game. But only participants are mandated to imagine these 
fictional truths: qua imaginers, they are subject to imaginative regulation, i.e., they must follow 
the general rule or norm mandating that fictional truths are to be imagined. Imaginative 
regulation obviously operates via stipulations that determine fictional truths, but should not be 
identified with these stipulations. Given that we are mandated to imagine fictional truths, they 
must somehow be set down. But imaginative regulation should not be identified with stipulations 
or any other mechanism for setting down which propositions are fictionally true. 
Let us examine how imagining ‘aims at the fictional truth’ in the stumps-are-bears game. 
The stipulation that tree-stumps are fictional bears, in itself, does not mandate that the players 
imagine anything: it only entails that certain fictional truths obtain. Upon seeing a tree-stump, the 
players are induced to imagine a bear, since they are following the rule or norm that governs 
imaginings in general, namely, that imaginers are to imagine that which is fictionally true. 
Similarly, when we engage with a work of fiction, we are induced to imagine the work’s content 
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because the work presents that content as true. That is, in reading or watching the work, we track 
the propositions it presents as truths, take them to be the fictional truths of our imaginative 
project, and, in line with the rule or norm governing imaginings in general, we imagine those 
propositions.3 
The import of Walton’s claim that imagining aims at the fictional truth just as belief aims at 
truth is that, to a great extent, the practices we adopt regarding what to imagine parallel our 
epistemic practices. Consider sensitivity to evidence. Usually, evidence to the effect that a 
certain proposition is true induces us to believe that proposition; absent evidence or beliefs to the 
contrary, we wind up believing that which we have evidence for. Of course, we sometimes act 
irrationally (e.g., self-deception). But we hardly seek, systematically and deliberately, to ignore 
evidence: being truth-directed, our beliefs are inherently responsive to evidence. On Walton’s 
view, the same is true of imagining vis-à-vis fictional truth. If an imaginer has evidence to the 
effect that a certain proposition is true, she is induced to imagine it; absent evidence to the 
contrary, she winds up imagining it. 
Here, however, imagining’s similarity to belief breaks down, hence Walton’s claim seems to 
be incorrect. We can have clear-cut evidence that certain propositions are fictional falsehoods, 
yet deliberately imagine them—without violating any rule or norm. Moreover, it seems that, in 
such cases, we are mandated to imagine fictional falsehoods. For instance, a novel’s early 
chapters might present the protagonist as benevolent, a plan as successful, or a building as about 
 
3 Walton’s idea also applies to spontaneous imaginings: spontaneously imagining a proposition 




to explode, whereas the last chapters reveal that the protagonist was malevolent, the plan was a 
failure, and the building was not about to explode. In such cases, readers of the early chapters are 
mandated to imagine fictional falsehoods. This is so even when novels are read a second time. In 
rereading the early chapters, i.e., while knowing the novel’s fictional truths, readers are to set 
aside their knowledge of those fictional truths, and imagine propositions they know to be 
fictionally false. 
Imaginers are similarly mandated to deliberately imagine fictional falsehoods in other 
contexts too. A participant in the stumps-are-bears game might plan to imagine (for fun, 
learning, etc.) that she is unaware of a bear, surprised by a bear, etc. Knowing that there is a 
stump behind her, and therefore that it is fictionally true that there is a bear behind her, she has 
no difficulty in imagining the fictional falsehood that there is no bear there, as per her planned 
‘simulation.’ It seems that, in general, imaginings are structured so as to allow us to ‘simulate’ 
erroneous perspectives, that is, to imagine fictional falsehoods. Parallel cases of belief—i.e., 
cases where we straightforwardly believe, upon intention or instruction, what we know to be 
false—are highly implausible. That belief and imagining differ so significantly vis-à-vis their 
sensitivity to evidence seems to undermine Walton’s claim that imagining aims at the fictional 
truth just as belief aims at truth. 
I will not propose a full answer to this problem here, since my focus is the relation between 
the regulation of imagining and imaginative immersion. Elsewhere I have proposed revising 
Walton’s thesis so that imagining is regulated, not by fictional truth, but by that which is 
presented, at each stage of the imaginative project, as fictionally true. This claim is explained by 
the fact that, in imagining, we are ipso facto posited to play the role of fictional believers (see 
Chasid 2019; forthcoming-a). That is, imagining entails acting as though, in the fictional world, 
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our perspective is doxastic; it thus follows that imaginings are sensitive, not to fictional truth, but 
to that which is presented (at each stage of the project) as fictionally true. Hence if a work 
initially depicts a character as benevolent, we are mandated to imagine that the character is 
benevolent even if we are rereading the book and know it to be fictionally false that she is 
benevolent. This mandate ensues from the fact that the character is, initially, presented as being 
benevolent. Adopting the perspective of fictional believers, we track the ‘evidence’ provided at 
each stage, and imagine the character as benevolent. Similarly, in the stumps-are-bears game, if a 
participant plans to imagine the fictional falsehood that there is no bear behind her, she can set 
aside her knowledge of the tree-stump behind her, imagining, say, that, being preoccupied with 
something else, she is unaware of the bear behind her. 
A comprehensive defense of the ‘fictional doxastic perspective’ thesis cannot be provided 
here. For the sake of argument, instead of saying that imaginings are regulated by fictional truths 
(as Walton argues), we can say that they are regulated by that which is presented as fictionally 
true at each stage, or—to abbreviate—by the apparent fictional truths. Note that this revision of 
Walton’s thesis is a minor element of the proposed account of immersion, which can be readily 
adapted to fit views that uphold Walton’s original thesis, and argue that normally, our practices 
vis-à-vis imagining and fictional truths are the same as our epistemic practices. 
Given that the general rule or norm that regulates imagining is that imaginers are to imagine 
the propositions presented, at each stage of a project, as fictional truths, the core aspect of 
immersion pertains to how this general rule or norm is followed, a question discussed in the next 
section. 
 




4.1 Imagining without (Explicit) Doxastic Mediation 
 
There are various ways in which propositions can be presented as fictional truths, and hence 
various ways in which an imaginer can follow the general rule or norm that such propositions are 
to be imagined. What is crucial to immersion is the extent to which following this general rule or 
norm involves explicit beliefs about the specifics of how it is to be followed, i.e., beliefs about 
which propositions are presented as fictional truths. I will defend the thesis that the less one 
imagines by virtue of acquiring such beliefs, the more immersed in imagining one is. 
Note that I am not speaking of beliefs whose content ‘replicates’ the content of real-world 
beliefs. It is widely accepted that imaginings are routinely informed by the imaginer’s beliefs.4 
For instance, in imagining Paris at night, a devastating earthquake, or a wombat, our imaginings 
generally replicate what we believe about Paris, earthquakes, and wombats. In defending the 
thesis that the fewer the imaginer’s (explicit) mediating beliefs, the greater her immersion, I am 
not speaking of beliefs that play this sort of ‘background’ role. Rather, I am speaking of beliefs 
about the fictional world (i.e., the ‘world’ of a game, pretense, work of fiction, etc.). 
Note also that, although having beliefs about the fictional world entails that the subject 
possesses the concept of fiction, it does not entail that the subject understands this concept at the 
metaphysical or philosophical level.5 What is crucial for the proposed account is that imaginers 
 
4 See, e.g., Walton (1990) ch. 4; Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), 12ff; Nichols (2006), §3.5. And 
see §4.2 below. 
5 A similar claim is made by Langland-Hassan (2020, ch. 7) regarding the concept of pretense. 
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are capable of distinguishing between reality and fiction, or between what obtains in reality and 
what obtains in the world of a game, pretense, fictional work, etc. Given that an imaginer is 
capable of making this distinction, she can likewise have explicit beliefs about the fictional. 
Indeed, it is widely accepted by psychologists and philosophers that not only adults and teens, 
but even children as young as two years old, can distinguish between reality and fiction (see, 
e.g., Harris and Kavanagh 1993; Leslie 1994; Currie 1998; Harris 2000; Nichols and Stich 2003; 
Nichols 2006; Langland-Hassan 2020). Moreover, it has been shown that young children can 
explicitly distinguish not only between reality and fiction, but also between different fictional 
worlds (Skolnick and Bloom 2006). It follows that young children, in particular, may also have 
explicit beliefs about the fictional world of their game of make-believe, pretense, etc., and hence, 
according to the proposed account, they can be immersed in their imaginings to varying degrees.6 
 
6 Since young children can be immersed in imagining to varying degrees, it is important to 
acknowledge their ability to hold explicit beliefs about the fictional world, as per my claim that 
the more an imaginer holds such beliefs, the less immersed she is. For one thing, when asked 
about the fictional world (e.g., the world of the game of make-believe they just played), young 
children respond in a manner demonstrating that they can hold such explicit beliefs. For another, 
when invited to play a new game, or when a new stipulation or prop is introduced during a game, 
they can acquire such beliefs (e.g., ‘this box is an oven’; ‘this coin is a pie’; etc.). To the extent 
that young children engage in imagining (and not in falsely believing fictional content), they can 
distinguish between reality and fiction, and hold beliefs, explicit or non-explicit, about the 
fiction; they can thus be immersed to varying degrees. 
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Let us see how the thesis that the less we imagine by virtue of acquiring explicit beliefs, the 
more immersed in imagining we are, applies to the stumps-are-bears game. (For convenience, 
‘beliefs’ will hereafter refer to explicit beliefs, unless otherwise stated).7 Consider a scenario in 
which a player: (1) visually experiences a tree-stump at a certain spot, and accordingly, (2) 
believes that it is fictionally true that there is a bear there, and therefore, (3) imagines that there is 
a bear there.8 On this scenario, stage (2) mediates between stages (1) and (3): the player imagines 
a bear by virtue of believing that it is (apparently) fictionally true, in the game she is playing, that 
there is a bear at that spot. 
 
7 As explained in §2.2, my account is compatible with the claim that even fully-immersed 
imaginers can have non-occurrent, dispositional, or unconscious beliefs about the fictional world. 
The crucial point is that immersed imaginers do not explicitly think about which propositions are 
to be imagined, and hence imagine the propositions without explicit doxastic mediation. 
8 It might also be the case that stage (2) does not ensue directly from stage (1), but from the 
perceptual belief that there is a tree-stump at that spot, which follows from (1). The present paper 
does not focus on this sort of doxastic mediation, viz., doxastic mediation of perceptual 
experience; my account of immersion is compatible both with accounts that uphold it, and 
accounts on which imaginings ensue directly from visual experiences, without the mediation of 
perceptual beliefs. Likewise, my account is compatible with doxastic theories of perception, on 
which the visual experience at stage (1) is nothing more than the perceptual belief that there is a 
tree-stump at a certain spot. The key question vis-à-vis immersion is whether beliefs about the 
apparent fictional truths are generated by a perceptual experience. 
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Compare this scenario to a different scenario, in which the player reaches stage (3) without 
going through stage (2): she visually experiences a tree-stump at a certain spot, and therefore 
imagines that there is a bear there. The player’s imagining that a bear is there ensues directly 
from her visual experience of the tree-stump. Of course, in both scenarios, the player is generally 
aware that she is playing a game of make-believe in which tree-stumps are stipulated to be 
fictional bears. But only in the second scenario is it the case that she does not acquire beliefs 
about the specifics of how to apply the general rule or norm governing imagining. She imagines 
that there is a bear at that spot immediately upon seeing a tree-stump, without the mediation of 
the belief that it is fictionally true, by virtue of the stumps-are-bears stipulation, that there is a 
bear there. Since, on this scenario, the player’s imaginative activity is not mediated by beliefs 
about the specific to-be-imagined propositions, she is deemed more immersed in her imaginative 
project than she is on the first scenario. 
The distinction between imagining that involves acquiring beliefs, and ‘direct’ imagining, 
applies not only to imaginings that arise in response to perceptual experience, but also to other 
imaginings. In the stumps-are-bears game, for instance, suppose the players imagine carrying out 
specific (fictional) actions. A player might imagine that she is searching for a bear behind a 
clump of bushes. She can do so either indirectly, by first acquiring the belief ‘it is fictionally true 
that I am searching for a bear,’ or directly, without holding this belief. In the latter case, she is 
deemed more immersed in imagining than in the former, since her compliance with the general 
rule that she is to imagine that which is presented as fictionally true involves less doxastic 
mediation. 
As explained in §2.2, the distinction between following a rule or norm by way of doxastic 
mediation and following it without doxastic mediation applies not only to imagining, but also to 
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other regulated activities, e.g., linguistic activities, cultural activities, etc. To the extent that we 
do not acquire explicit beliefs about the details of how to follow grammatical rules or cultural 
norms, we are more immersed in the activity, since we follow the relevant rules or norms without 
consciously invoking the specifics of how they apply in each case (e.g., we can form a sentence 
without explicitly thinking that a certain phrase, being a noun phrase, can serve as the subject, 
and that another phrase can serve as the predicate, etc.) An immersed imaginer likewise has 
fewer (or no) explicit real-time beliefs as to how her imaginings are to unfold. She imagines 
without the involvement of such beliefs, and does not need to consciously ‘step outside’ her 
imaginings, so to speak, to ensure their compliance with that which has been presented as 
fictionally true. 
 
4.2 Varieties of Doxastically-(Un)Mediated Imaginings 
 
In the example discussed in §4.1, the imaginer’s degree of immersion was a function of a single 
variable, namely, whether her imaginings ensued directly from visual experience, or indirectly, 
via beliefs regarding what her visual experience implied about the pertinent fictional truths. In 
addition to visually experiencing props (e.g., tree-stumps in the ‘stumps-are-bears’ game), there 
are other ways in which propositions can be presented as fictional truths, i.e., as ‘to-be-imagined’ 
propositions. With respect to each of these ways, such propositions can be imagined either via 
doxastic mediation, or without doxastic mediation. Hence an imaginer’s degree of immersion 
depends on several variables. Indeed, given that immersion is gradational and not binary, the 
degree to which an imaginer is immersed reflects the overall number of mediating beliefs she 
acquires. I will now elucidate this point further, explaining how with respect to each of the 
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various ways in which propositions can be presented as fictionally true, we can imagine by 
acquiring explicit beliefs about these ‘to-be-imagined’ propositions, or without acquiring such 
beliefs. Again, the argument applies to each such way: to the extent that an imaginer ‘exits’ her 
stream of imaginings to ascertain whether a proposition is presented as fictionally true, she is less 
immersed in her imaginings. 
Let us first consider guided imaginative projects: projects that are prompted by an intention, 
or arise in response to instructions, etc. Consider the case of engaging with a work of fiction. 
Aware that we are reading fiction, we imagine the work’s (apparent) fictional truths. We do so 
by apprehending, at each stage in the unfolding of the narrative, the propositions that the work 
describes as truths.9 We take these propositions to be the fictional truths—the to-be-imagined 
propositions—and imagine them. In other words, we follow the general rule or norm that these 
‘truths’ are to be imagined. But do we follow it by acquiring beliefs about how to follow it? 
Consider two scenarios. On one scenario, we: (1) apprehend the propositions that the work 
presents as truths, (2) believe that these propositions are presented as fictional truths (and hence 
are ‘to be-imagined’), and (3) imagine these propositions. On this scenario, our imaginative 
activity is regulated by the apparent fictional truths indirectly, via mediating beliefs (stage 2). On 
the second scenario, no mediating beliefs arise. We: (1) apprehend the propositions that the work 
presents as truths, and (2) imagine them. We do not acquire beliefs about which propositions we 
 
9 Note that the way in which a work of fiction describes something as true does not depend on 
any specific theory of fiction or imagination: we discover what a work of fiction describes as or 
assumes to be true just as we discover what works of nonfiction (e.g., histories, biographies, 
newspaper articles, etc.) describe as or assume to be true. See Chasid (forthcoming-b). 
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are supposed to imagine. Rather, we respond to the work directly by imagining the propositions 
it presents as truths. Here, we are more immersed in imagining than we were on the first 
scenario. Although on both scenarios we are aware that we are engaging with fiction, in the case 
of the first scenario, conscious, occurrent beliefs about the apparent fictional truths ‘disrupt’ our 
imaginative activity: in addition to being attentive to the fictional content by simply imagining it, 
we also attend to that content by holding explicit beliefs about its having been presented by the 
work as fictionally true, diminishing our immersion. 
When engaging with fiction, we also ‘inflate’ the fictional world beyond what is overtly 
described by the work. The ability to imagine implied fictional truths by imagining explicit ones 
ensues from a belief-like feature of imagining in general. There is broad agreement that 
imagining mirrors the inferential patterns of belief.10 Applying these inferential patterns in 
imaginative projects involves not only imaginings (e.g., imagining that p, and imagining that if p 
then q, can lead to imagining that q), but also beliefs, which can lead to replication, in our 
imaginative project, of the content of our beliefs about the real world. For instance, in imagining 
that the protagonist is human, we are ordinarily (i.e., absent defeating conditions) led to imagine 
that she has salient human properties; in imagining that clouds are blocking the sun, we are 
ordinarily led to imagine that it’s getting darker outside, as per our belief that it gets darker 
outside when the sun is blocked; etc. Our beliefs about imagined objects or events inform our 
imaginings through the patterns of inference that apply to beliefs. 
 
10 See, e.g., Walton (1990) ch. 4; Currie and Ravenscroft (2002), 12ff; Nichols and Stich (2003), 




Vis-à-vis immersion, the relevant question is whether these patterns apply directly, or via 
explicit beliefs about the implied fictional truths. In engaging with a work of fiction, if we have 
to consciously ponder whether it implies that a certain proposition is fictionally true or fictionally 
false, or whether the fictional world is indeterminate in this respect, our degree of immersion is 
reduced. Such a need to actively draw inferences about the fictional world might arise if we do 
not immediately grasp how the pertinent fictional world is structured, which implied ‘facts’ are 
essential to the plot, where the work is leading us. In reading a description of, e.g., two old 
friends strolling through a park as the sun is setting, we imagine the explicitly-described content, 
and may find it natural to inflate that content and imagine that the protagonists have certain 
thoughts, memories, and emotions, that twilight shadows are being cast on the path through the 
park, etc. But why is only this sort of inflation of the fictional world natural? Why not proceed to 
further imagine that the protagonists like ice-cream (who doesn’t?), or that nuclear fusion is 
occurring in the sun? After all, these propositions can also follow by the said patterns of 
inference. 
How we discover the implied to-be-imagined propositions is indeed a key question. 
Philosophers have suggested that this might require familiarity with the author’s intentions and 
the work’s structural features, artistic conventions, genre, etc. (see, e.g., Walton (1990), ch. 4; 
Van Leeuwen (2013), 228; Stock (2017), ch. 6). But this is not a crucial point for the proposed 
account of immersion. However the implicit to-be-imagined propositions are identified, what 
matters vis-à-vis immersion is, again, the extent to which the imaginer acquires beliefs about 
these propositions. To the extent that the imaginer thinks about which propositions are implicitly 
presented as fictional truths, and holds conscious, occurrent beliefs about them in the course of 
following the general rule that they are to be imagined, her immersion diminishes. To the extent 
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that she gains familiarity with the factors that determine what the work implicitly sets down as 
fictionally true, and hence acquires fewer, or no, explicit beliefs about the implied fictional 
truths, her immersion increases. 
Indeed, Liao’s claim that immersed imaginers attend to the “happenings of the story world” 
rather than “the writing style, the plot structure, and other features about the book itself” (Liao, 
unpublished, 7) is partly correct. Insofar as the reader imagines the happenings of the story’s 
world, she attends to them even if she is not immersed in her imaginings. But it is true that if, in 
addition to imagining, the reader explicitly thinks about the work’s structure, style, etc., she is 
less immersed in imagining. On the proposed account of imaginative immersion, this diminished 
immersion ensues because in order to follow the general rule or norm of imagining (i.e., to 
imagine that which is presented as fictionally true), an imaginer who lacks familiarity with the 
factors that determine which implicit propositions are apparently fictionally true must actively 
acquire beliefs about them. 
The distinction between doxastically-mediated imagining and non-doxastically-mediated 
imagining is relevant not only to works of fiction, but also to other sorts of guided imaginative 
projects. External guidance as to which propositions are fictional truths can, e.g., come from 
‘props,’ as in the stumps-are-bears game: a banana can be a telephone, an actor can be Henry V, 
etc. The fictional truths generated by such props inform imaginings either mediately, via explicit 
beliefs that specific propositions are presented as fictional truths, or directly, without the 
mediation of such beliefs. An actor who plays Henry V, for instance, does not need to explicitly 
think about the specific fictional truths that are generated at each stage of the drama: he can 
imagine these propositions without doxastic awareness that they are fictional truths, in which 
case he will be more immersed in his imaginings. Those watching his performance may likewise 
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imagine the said propositions either via beliefs about the fictional truths, or directly. As shown in 
§4.1, perceptual experience often plays a role in prompting doxastically-unmediated imagining. 
That an imaginer can perceive an object and immediately imagine the fictional truths it generates 
is particularly relevant to becoming immersed in visual works of fiction, e.g., plays, movies, and, 
on some views, pictures, sculptures, etc.11 
A further variable on which the degree of immersion depends is the extent to which one’s 
imaginings arise in response to one’s own (explicit) intentions.12 Someone can intend to imagine, 
say, that she is walking through the jungle, a tiger starts to chase her, and she manages to escape. 
In such cases, the degree to which the imaginer is immersed is relatively low, or more precisely: 
lower than it would be were these imaginings to ensue spontaneously. As Walton argues (1990, 
14-15), one who imagines unintentionally, finding herself presented with ‘facts’ of a fictional 
world, is generally more immersed in imagining than she would be had her imaginings arisen in 
response to intentions to imagine. On the account of immersion I am proposing, this is because 
intentions to imagine entail explicitly thinking about the fictional world: imagining by 
summoning up the ‘to-be-imagined’ propositions—i.e., those that one plans to invoke as the 
pertinent fictional truths—straightforwardly entails that the imaginings are doxastically-
 
11 See Walton (1990), ch. 8; see also Chasid (2016). 
12 I am assuming, as is widely accepted, that imaginings can arise spontaneously, i.e., without 
intentions. Those who maintain that spontaneous imaginings rest on implicit intentions, or on 
what are sometimes called ‘tacit’ intentions (see, e.g., Boghossian 2008, 488), can construe the 




mediated.13 In short, the extent to which imaginings ensue non-deliberately is another variable 
that determines an imaginer’s degree of immersion. Spontaneous imaginings are indeed “more 
gripping” (Walton 1990, 15), because having fewer (or no) intentions-to-imagine means that the 
pertinent fictional truths are ‘revealed’ without doxastic mediation. 
Yet another variable on which the degree of immersion depends is the imaginer’s relation to 
the mental imagery that accompanies her imaginings. Mental images can arise in spontaneous 
imagining, in intended imagining, in imaginings that unfold in response to instructions, etc.14 In 
general, mental images convey to us what various things look like, sound like, etc. When called 
up in an imaginative project, they present certain propositions as fictional truths (i.e., 
propositions that are to be imagined), thereby inducing us to imagine these propositions.15 
 
13 As Setiya (2018, §5) points out, it is widely accepted that intentions entail beliefs about what 
one intends to do. Yet even without this premise, having an explicit intention to imagine certain 
propositions entails having a mental representation of what one intends to imagine. The ensuing 
imaginings are thus mediated by occurrent, non-dispositional representations about that which is 
fictionally true, hence the low degree of immersion. 
14 My argument is neutral regarding the controversial question of whether mental images 
necessarily arise in imaginative projects; see Walton (1990), 13; Kind (2001); (2016), 7; Van 
Leeuwen (2013), 222. 
15 The intuition that mental images are akin to perceptual experiences seems to be supported by 
psychological research: empirical findings show that the more vivid (i.e., clear, colorful, well-
defined) mental images are, the more similar they are to perceptual experiences; see, e.g., Green 




Vis-à-vis immersion, the crucial question is, again, whether our imaginings are mediated by 
explicit beliefs about the fictional scenarios depicted by mental imagery. Mental images can, in 
principle, present fictional scenarios, and direct us to imagine certain propositions, without 
mediation by beliefs; insofar as they do so, mental images can, in themselves, increase 
immersion. But they sometimes involve doxastic mediation. First, if mental images arise in 
response to an intention to imagine, the imaginer will be less immersed than she would be were 
the very same imaginings and images to arise spontaneously (unbidden, unintentionally), as 
explained above apropos imaginative projects that arise in response to intentions.16 
Secondly, even when a mental image arises spontaneously, we sometimes imagine the 
fictional content it depicts via mediating beliefs about that content: we first acquire explicit 
beliefs about the propositions the image presents as fictionally true, then proceed to imagine 
those propositions. Such doxastic mediation diminishes immersion. In cases where the image is 
insufficiently vivid (see note 15), imagining the to-be-imagined propositions—the propositions 
that the image presents as fictionally true—may oblige us to acquire beliefs of the form ‘this is 
what the fictional scenario looks like.’ In such cases, since our imaginings proceed via doxastic 
 
mental images and absorption in imaginings is also supported by empirical evidence (Donahue 
2009; Iachini 2019). The proposed account of imaginative immersion explains this correlation: 
vivid images, in resembling perceptual experiences to a significant degree, require less 
awareness, on the part of the imaginer, of the manner in which they present the fictional world, 
and hence enable her to be more immersed in her imaginings. 
16 There is empirical support for this claim: Iachini et al. (2019) found that control over mental 
images is not positively correlated with characteristic features of immersion. 
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mediation, we are less immersed than we would be in cases where we can imagine what the 
image depicts without acquiring specific mediating beliefs. In short, mental images present a 
perception-like portrayal of the fictional world. To the extent that their content is imagined 
without the mediation of explicit beliefs about or explicit intentions as to that content, 
imaginative immersion is enhanced. 
To recapitulate, given that immersion is gradational, not binary, the degree to which an 
imaginer is immersed in imagining depends on the degree to which her imaginings are mediated 
by beliefs. Propositions can be presented as fictional truths—and hence, as the content that is to 
be imagined—in various ways, for instance, through the use of props, through instructions to 
imagine various scenarios, patterns of inference, structural factors, mental images, etc.; with 
respect to each mode of presenting fictional truths, the rule or norm that the apparent fictional 
truths are to be imagined can be followed with varying degrees of directness, or more precisely, 
involves explicit mediating beliefs to varying degrees. To the extent that we imagine without 
acquiring such beliefs, we are more immersed in imagining. 
 
5. Attentiveness, Emotional Responses, Spoilers 
 
The proposed account assumes that ‘immersion’ does not always connote attentiveness. In 
certain contexts, specifically, that of imagining, being immersed in an activity is related to the 
normative dimension of that activity. In these contexts, one is deemed more immersed in the 
activity to the extent that one applies the rules that govern it without acquiring explicit beliefs 
about how the rules are to be applied to the particular instance at hand. Undeniably, being 
immersed in works of fiction, games of make-believe, daydreams, etc., differs from immersion in 
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cultural or linguistic activities. Imaginings, unlike the latter activities, pertain to a fictional 
world: they are regulated by that which is presented, in the pertinent imaginative project, as 
fictionally true. 
This similarity between imaginings and beliefs can create the impression that an immersed 
imaginer loses track of reality, takes the imagined propositions to be true, is unaware that she is 
imagining (Schellenberg 2013; cf. Liao and Doggett 2014). If imaginings (and their ‘outputs’: 
emotions, motivations, etc.) are governed directly by what is presented as true in the fictional 
world, it might seem as if an immersed imaginer, being in the grip of the fictional, is ignorant of 
real-world facts, unaware that she is imagining, etc. Yet this is not so, as the arguments 
mentioned in §2.1 show. Immersed imaginers do have the general awareness that they are 
imagining, and can distinguish between reality and fiction. What they lack is real-time awareness 
of the details of how their imaginings comply with the rule or norm governing imagining in 
general, namely, that imaginers are to imagine that which is presented as fictionally true. This 
rule or norm becomes ‘transparent,’ just as grammatical rules or cultural norms become 
‘transparent’ for those who are immersed in a language or culture. 
Some aspects of immersion may indeed induce the imaginer to be particularly attentive to 
the fictional world, and thus less aware of her actual environment. One such aspect is the 
presence of mental images. Becoming immersed by way of imaginings accompanied by vivid 
mental images (discussed in §4.2 above) reduces the imaginer’s perception of real-world facts. It 
is empirically established that perceptual experience disrupts mental imagery (see, e.g., Craver-
Lemley and Reeves (1992); Vredeveldt et al. (2011)). Although imagining can continue even if 
perceptual stimuli disrupt mental imagery, this disruption increases the number of the imaginer’s 
explicit beliefs about the apparent fictional truths (e.g., beliefs such as ‘this is what the fictional 
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creature looks like’), diminishing immersion. Accordingly, to the extent that an imaginer 
perceptually ‘tunes out’ her environment, she imagines the ‘truths’ presented by the mental 
images via fewer mediating beliefs, and her immersion increases. 
Of course, intense attentiveness to an imaginative project generally lessens an imaginer’s 
attention to real-world facts. For it is a commonplace that concentrating on one thing renders us 
less aware of other things. However, low awareness of real-world facts due to intense 
attentiveness to one’s imaginative project does not straightforwardly distinguish immersed 
imaginers from non-immersed. Attentive to their respective imaginative projects in one way or 
another, both immersed and non-immersed imaginers may not notice that their coffee is getting 
cold, someone has entered the room, etc. What distinguishes an immersed imaginer from a non-
immersed imaginer is the extent to which they acquire beliefs about the to-be-imagined 
propositions. Whereas the immersed imaginer attends to the fictional content solely, or mainly, 
by imagining it, the non-immersed imaginer’s attention is divided between acquiring explicit 
beliefs about the fictional content and imagining that content. 
Considering the difference between a non-immersed imaginer and a non-imaginer can 
further clarify the relation between attentiveness and immersion. Emerging from a daydream, 
one is no longer immersed in it simply because one is no longer engaged in imagining. Finding a 
novel boring, and barely attentive to its fictional content, the reader hasn’t lost her immersion in 
imagining that content while continuing to imagine it without immersion, but has simply stopped 
imagining that content. Similarly, a sudden thirst, hearing a door slam, etc., can bring imaginings 
to an end. The abrupt loss of attentiveness to fictional content is not ordinarily indicative of non-
immersion, but rather, indicates the cessation of imagining. Of course, an imaginer who decides 
to re-engage with a disrupted imaginative project will not become re-immersed immediately, 
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since she must re-engage with the project by acquiring explicit beliefs, i.e., must recall the 
project’s fictional content at the disruption point. 
The proposed cognitive model of imaginative immersion also explains the imaginer’s 
responses to her imaginings. As I argued in §2.1, immersion cannot be defined or explained in 
terms of an imaginer’s responses to her imaginings, since responses (e.g., emotional, 
motivational, etc.) are not always relevant to imagined content: the imaginer can be immersed in 
imagining without responding in any specific way. Where responses are relevant, however, 
immersed imaginers seem to respond to imaginings differently than non-immersed imaginers do, 
for instance, by being more emotionally engaged in the fictional content (see, e.g., Green and 
Donahue 2009; Langland-Hassan 2020, ch. 9). 
On the proposed account, such differences are not due to differences in the imagined 
content: immersed and non-immersed imaginers can imagine the same propositions. The fact 
that, despite imagining the same content, the immersed and the non-immersed imaginers respond 
to their imaginings differently, ensues from the general difference between an imaginer’s 
emotional response to imagining a proposition, and her emotional response to believing that 
proposition to be fictionally true (see, e.g., Doggett and Egan 2012; Van Leeuwen 2020). Since 
beliefs about fictional truths play a role in the imaginer’s overall system of beliefs and desires 
(and can therefore serve as reasons for real-world conduct), they tend to generate emotional 
responses that differ from those generated by imagining the fictional truths in question. For 
instance, imagining that a hero sacrifices himself might generate sorrow, regret, or admiration 
(or, for those who accept imaginative analogs of emotions: ‘i-sorrow,’ ‘i-regret’ etc.; see, e.g., 
Doggett and Egan 2012; Gendler and Liao 2019, §2.2), whereas the belief that it is fictionally 
true that the hero sacrifices himself might, as a belief about how the fictional events have 
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unfolded, generate aesthetic pleasure. A belief that it is fictionally true that the hero’s long 
journey will not end soon may annoy the reader, since she knows she must soon stop reading and 
get back to work, whereas the reader’s imagining that the journey will not end soon might 
generate fear, frustration, etc. 
On the proposed account, the fact that imaginings tend to generate emotional responses that 
differ from those generated by beliefs about the same fictional truths explains why an immersed 
imaginer is more emotionally engaged with the fictional content than a non-immersed imaginer 
is. Since in addition to imagining various propositions, a non-immersed imaginer also holds 
beliefs about these propositions’ being fictional truths, his real-time emotional state is 
determined by those beliefs as well as by his imaginings. The real-time emotional state of an 
immersed imaginer, however, is determined solely by imaginings. Not having (real-time) beliefs 
about the fictional truths, the immersed imaginer responds emotionally to the imagined 
propositions, achieving greater emotional engagement with them than is attained by a non-
immersed imaginer, who is also responding emotionally to her explicit beliefs about the fictional 
truths. 
The same sort of argument might apply in contexts where imaginings can engender 
motivations to act, e.g., pretending and games of make-believe. Since an immersed imaginer has 
fewer, or no, beliefs about the fictional truths, she seems to act solely on the strength of her 
imaginings, whereas a non-immersed imaginer seems to act on the strength of her beliefs about 
the fictional truths (i.e., about how she is supposed to act in the pretend world). However, since 
there is an ongoing debate over whether, and the extent to which, imaginings can directly 
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motivate an imaginer to act,17 this putative difference between immersed and non-immersed 
imaginers should be discussed separately. 
Spoilers are another phenomenon that the proposed cognitive model of imaginative 
immersion explains. Spoilers apprise us of a given work of fiction’s truths and plot 
developments—especially the ending—before we have engaged with the work. Although they do 
not thwart imagining, they have an adverse effect on our engagement with the work. What 
accounts for this adverse effect? After all, beliefs about the fictional truths cannot spoil a reader’s 
or viewer’s engagement with a work of fiction directly. Rather, such beliefs affect our 
engagement with the fictional work in question indirectly, by influencing the way we imagine 
the fictional content. 
Note that the phenomenon of spoilers confirms that imaginings are inherently rule-
governed. Were imaginings totally unconstrained, following instructions to imagine certain 
propositions while knowing what we are going to be asked to imagine later would not pose any 
problem. Advance knowledge of the fictional truths would not interfere with our imaginings 
were it not the case that they were supposed to unfold in a specific way—a way that can be 
influenced, and sometimes disrupted, by beliefs about what we will be asked to imagine at a later 
stage. 
Imaginative regulation explains the spoiler phenomenon. Imaginings are regulated by that 
which a work of fiction presents, at each point in its unfolding, as fictionally true. When we 
know all the fictional truths beforehand, complying with the constraints on imagining while 
reading the work is disconcerting, and impels us to have recourse to explicit doxastic mediation. 
 
17 For an overview, see Ichino (2019). 
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Spoilers do not thwart imagining, but they prevent us from becoming immersed in imagining. 
We can imagine what the work describes as true at each stage, but to do so, we must remain 
mindful of any differences between the set of fictional truths (which the spoiler has apprised us 
of), and what is currently being presented as fictionally true, set aside our knowledge of the 
former, and find the proper way to imagine only the latter. 
Carrying out this task may be difficult. Consider an example. Suppose that, without having 
any exposure to a spoiler, the work we are reading initially describes A as benevolent, or B as 
dying. We respond by readily imagining that A is benevolent / B is dying, and also ‘inflate’ our 
project by imagining the likely consequences of A’s benevolence / B’s impending death. But if 
we know, from a spoiler, that it is fictionally true that A is malevolent, and that B eventually 
recovers, it is difficult to comply, as per the general rule or norm that regulates imagining, with 
the novel’s prompts to imagine that A is benevolent / B is dying, and difficult to imagine the 
consequences of A’s benevolence / B’s prospective death. The difficulty ensues because reading 
the initial descriptions of A or B immediately elicits the beliefs about A and B acquired from the 
spoiler. We must therefore set these beliefs aside and focus on the propositions currently being 
presented as fictional truths: we must discern the truths that follow from the novel’s description 
of A as benevolent / B as dying, without taking into consideration what we already know about 
A and B. Pinpointing which propositions are currently being presented as truths involves 
acquiring explicit beliefs about those propositions, hence our imaginings become doxastically-
mediated, and our immersion is reduced. In general, a spoiler adversely affects our engagement 
with fiction because it imposes the burden of detecting the apparent fictional truths, thereby 
reducing our immersion. 
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In sum, though spoilers do not thwart imagining, they diminish our ability to be immersed in 
imagining, as they make it difficult for imaginings to be governed directly by the apparent 
fictional truths. In so doing, they also affect our (real-time) emotional responses to the fictional 
content. As I explained, emotional responses to imaginings alone differ from emotional 
responses to imaginings that are accompanied by beliefs about the fictional truths, since beliefs 
about those ‘truths’ tend to generate different emotional responses than imaginings do. If we’ve 
been exposed to a spoiler, when we proceed to read the novel, our overall occurrent cognitive 
state incorporates both imaginings and beliefs (i.e., beliefs about the fictional truths). Moreover, 
thinking about what we are currently being asked to imagine, and distinguishing it from what we 
will be asked to imagine, renders our overall emotional state very different from the emotional 
response we would have were we to imagine only the propositions currently presented as 
fictional truths (i.e., had we not been exposed to the spoiler). 
If, despite the spoiler, we succeed in setting aside our beliefs about the fictional truths, so 
that no such beliefs are prompted when we engage with the work in question, we can become 
immersed in imagining, and our engagement with the work will not be spoiled. For in general, to 
the extent that our imaginings are guided solely by the apparent fictional truths, we are immersed 




In many cases, immersion in an activity is not simply a matter of attentiveness, but ensues from 
the way in which the rules or norms applicable to that activity are followed. The more they are 
followed without explicit doxastic mediation, the greater the immersion. This is specifically true 
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of imaginative immersion: to the extent that an imaginer follows the general rule or norm 
governing imagining (namely, that imaginers are to imagine the propositions presented as 
fictionally true) without acquiring explicit beliefs about which propositions are presented as 
fictional truths, she is more immersed in her imaginings. 
Immersion is gradational, not all-or-nothing. Given that propositions can be presented as 
fictional truths in different ways, how immersed in her imaginings an imaginer becomes depends 
on several variables. With respect to each of them, to the extent that imaginings arise without 
mediating beliefs, immersion increases. The proposed cognitive model of imaginative 
immersion, I showed, explains various features associated with imagining, including 
attentiveness, emotional responses, and the adverse effect of spoilers. 
The model also elucidates characteristics of imaginative immersion that come up in the 
empirical research on immersion. For instance, the sense of “flow” associated with being 
immersed (Green and Donahue 2009, 243)—presumably, effortless concentration on the 
imaginative project—is explained by the fact that immersed imaginers follow the rule or norm 
regulating imagining without reflecting on how it is to be followed. The correlation between 
immersion, lack of control over mental images, and vividness of mental images (see notes 15 and 
16) may be explained by the thesis that the more spontaneous and vivid an image is, the less 
there is a need for mediating beliefs in order to imagine what it presents as fictionally true. 
These and other features of imaginative immersion require further investigation. Specific 
features that call for explanation include the sense of being ‘transported’ into the fictional world 
(Green and Donahue 2009, 243), the feeling of ‘presence’ in the fictional world (Iachini et al. 
2019, 294), and similar features associated with the imaginer’s sense of being part of the 
fictional world. These feelings, I contend, can be explained by the thesis that just as beliefs are 
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governed by truths, imaginings are governed by the (apparent) fictional truths. For it seems that 
in imagining, an immersed imaginer adopts the perspective of a believer toward the imagined 
content, perhaps taking herself to be a ‘fictional believer.’18 This claim, however, merits a 
separate discussion.  
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